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The German frontier held a deep allure for Augustus, who regarded the warring tribes east of the Rhine as little more than savages ripe for conquest. Between 6 b.c. and a.d. 4, Roman legions had mounted repeated incursions into the tribal lands, eventually establishing a chain of bases on the Lippe and Weser rivers. In time, despite growing resentment of the Roman presence, the tribes exchanged iron, cattle, slaves and foodstuffs for Roman gold and silver coins and luxury goods. Some tribes even pledged allegiance to Rome; German mercenaries served with Roman armies as far away as the present-day Czech Republic.
One such German soldier of fortune, a 25-year-old prince of the Cherusci tribe, was known to the Romans as Arminius. (His tribal name has been lost to history.) He spoke Latin and was familiar with Roman tactics, the kind of man the Romans relied on to help their armies penetrate the lands of the barbarians. For his valor on the field of battle, he had been awarded the rank of knight and the honor of Roman citizenship. On that September day, he and his mounted auxiliaries were deputized to march ahead and rally some of his own tribesmen to help in putting down the rebellion.
Arminius’ motives are obscure, but most historians believe he had long harbored dreams of becoming king of his tribe. To achieve his goal, he concocted a brilliant deception: he would report a fictitious “uprising” in territory unfamiliar to the Romans, then lead them into a deadly trap. A rival chieftain, Segestes, repeatedly warned Varus that Arminius was a traitor, but Varus ignored him. “The Romans,” says Wells, “thought they were invincible.”
Arminius had instructed the Romans to make what he had described as a short detour, a one- or two-day march, into the territory of the rebels.The legionnaires followed along rudimentary trails that meandered among the Germans’ farmsteads, scattered fields, pastures, bogs and oak forests. As they progressed, the line of Roman troops—already seven or eight miles long, including local auxiliaries, camp followers and a train of baggage carts pulled by mules—became dangerously extended. The legionnaires, wrote third-century historian Cassius Dio, “were having a hard time of it, felling trees, building roads, and bridging places that required it. . . . Meanwhile, a violent rain and wind came up that separated them still further, while the ground, that had become slippery around the roots and logs, made walking very treacherous for them, and the tops of the trees kept breaking off and falling down, causing much confusion. While the Romans were in such difficulties, the barbarians suddenly surrounded them on all sides at once,” Dio writes of the preliminary German skirmishes. “At first they hurled their volleys from a distance; then, as no one defended himself and many were wounded, they approached closer to them.” Somehow, the command to attack had gone out to the German tribes. “This is pure conjecture,” says Benario, “but Arminius must have delivered a message that the Germans should begin their assault.”
The nearest Roman base lay at Haltern, 60 miles to the southwest. So Varus, on the second day, pressed on doggedly in that direction. On the third day, he and his troops were entering a passage between a hill and a huge swamp known as the Great Bog that, in places, was no more than 60 feet wide. As the increasingly chaotic and panicky mass of legionnaires, cavalrymen, mules and carts inched forward, Germans appeared from behind trees and sand-mound barriers, cutting off all possibility of retreat. “In open country, the superbly drilled and disciplined Romans would surely have prevailed,” says Wells. “But here, with no room to maneuver, exhausted after days of hit-and-run attacks, unnerved, they were at a crippling disadvantage.”
Varus understood that there was no escape. Rather than face certain torture at the hands of the Germans, he chose suicide, falling on his sword as Roman tradition prescribed. Most of his commanders followed suit, leaving their troops leaderless in what had become a killing field. “An army unexcelled in bravery, the first of Roman armies in discipline, in energy, and in experience in the field, through the negligence of its general, the perfidy of the enemy, and the unkindness of fortune. . . . was exterminated almost to a man by the very enemy whom it has always slaughtered like cattle,” according to the a.d. 30 account of Velleius Paterculus, a retired military officer who may have known both Varus and Arminius.
Only a handful of survivors managed somehow to escape into the forest and make their way to safety. The news they brought home so shocked the Romans that many ascribed it to supernatural causes, claiming a statue of the goddess Victory had ominously reversed direction. The historian Suetonius, writing a century after the battle, asserted that the defeat “nearly wrecked the empire.” Roman writers, says Wells, “were baffled by the disaster.” Though they blamed the hapless Varus, or the treachery of Arminius, or the wild landscape, in reality, says Wells, “the local societies were much more complex than the Romans thought. They were an informed, dynamic, rapidly changing people, who practiced complex farming, fought in organized military units, and communicated with each other across very great distances.”
More than 10 percent of the entire imperial army had been wiped out—the myth of its invincibility shattered. In the wake of the debacle, Roman bases in Germany were hastily abandoned. Augustus, dreading that Arminius would march on Rome, expelled all Germans and Gauls from the city and put security forces on alert against insurrections.


Comments
Although it took place some 2000 years ago it is still terribly sad.I have read and re-read the few modern books on the subject and the accounts of Tacitus and Vellius Pater---?(the general) and bits of Dio. It is remarkable that a British officer found the site thro'sheer singlemindedness. All my life I've been interested in Roman history(ancient). My curiousity was sparked one day as a small boy who wandered into a dingy museum in Wales. But I deviate! I have enjoyed reading your account of the Varus disaster. There are,however,unanswered questions,perhaps will never be answered. Why,for example,is no king mentioned? After all Arminius was a Prince? What of his mother? Was his brother, Flavius, a prince too before joining the Roman army. Why did he not join his brother? The river scene seems to suggest that they never really loved one another. Perhaps in those days,however, love never came into the equation...Regards Jeff Adams
Posted by Jeff Adams on March 11,2008 | 11:41AM
Next year, 2009 will be the 2000 anniversary of this battle. This is the original 911. 9/11/9 AD (11 September, 9) was the date of s great tragedy for Roman empire, but also a sea change in the development of Northern Europe and its offspring, 1500 years later; the Americas. People speculate on what might have been, but history is a one way river, with no regrets, no do-overs and no Mulligans. Germany the infant was born at this site in this battle. The joining together of the German tribes, to fight the Romans, was the beginning of a new stage in the history of the German peoples. From this battle we have the independence of a people, by their own hand, from Rome the conqueror, Rome the enforcer, Rome the Tax man. They proved themselves equal to the Romans in battle. They proved the Romans were not invincible. From this point on Rome began its long decline and eventual demise. Germany began its long ascent. When you see a bumper sticker that says: "Remember 9/11" ask yourself; "Which one?" 9/11/2001 or 9/11/9.
Posted by Guy K Bennett on July 29,2008 | 08:37PM
This is a fascinating piece of history that almost slipped away and doesn't receive the prominence it should. I remember first reading about this almost 30 years ago in a small entry in an enclyclopedia. One issue that has always bothered me is how these romain legions found themselves in this compromised and unwinnable situation. While the romans were not invincible, they did have a rigid approach to following rules while deployed and on the march. While Varus was a politician first and an field commander second (or more likely not at all) all roman legions had very strong and very capable professional soldiers at our equivalent of the non-commissioned officer level. The professional soldiers would simply not have allowed the deployment of soldiers discussed in the tellings of this battle here and by other sources. When roman legions were defeated (such as at Carrhae or Cannae) but it was almost always due to them being outfought and not cases where they were defeated by failure of adherence to elemental tactics. These histories I believe, but with obviously nothing more than a hunch, are missing something that explains a paradox of how three crack legions were slaughtered by failing to perhaps the most basic rule of marching by roman legions while deployed.
Posted by allan hughes on November 14,2008 | 08:34AM
Varus must have been overconfident, out of his league as a commander and thinking he was up against a motley group of disorganized tribes. Underestimating your enemies ability and overestimating your own capabilities usually leads to disaster and defeat. Great article, I'd love to go visit the site in Europe. I've often wondered where the battle took place.
Posted by Rich Valentini on March 1,2009 | 07:39PM
Being an old soldier myself I can say that discipline comes from above. During three wars I have seen some of the most disciplined troops take the easy way of doing things, things that they knew better than to do, short cuts ect. They took these "short cuts" only when they allowed by their leadership.
Althought these Roman troops were highly disciplined, it was their leadership which put them in the position that they found themselves. One must wonder, did a centurion go forward to express his concerns? Varus was a politician not a warrior. One would think that Augustus would know better than to do this. But in his defense, look how we fight wars today. Battle hardened generals are often dictated to by his countries politicans.
Posted by Kenneth Chambless on April 15,2009 | 03:31PM
I was riding my bike with a friend today, a student of German history and an ardent Germanophile, and somehow in our meanderings the subject of this battle came up. I said to him that I thought it was, of course, a great defeat for the Romans, but that the lessons drawn from it were often wrong. First, as the above article's title states, the victory was the result of an ambush orchestrated by a trusted Roman ally, Arminius, so what happened wasn't exactly fair. Second, the Romans' response in the years afterward reclaimed their honor, and their reputation, and essentially ended serious threats from east of the Rhine.(Read Mommsen, the great German historian; read the wiki entry on the battle, too -- I thought it was very good.) And third is what this defeat says about the Romans throughout their illustrious 1000-year history -- they always came back, until they couldn't. That wouldn't happen until 400 years after this battle occurred.
Posted by Mike Pellegrini on April 24,2009 | 07:08PM
A little battle in warfare history - a huge change in (european)history!
This varus defeat, formerly in Germany teached to haven taken place somewhere in 'Teutoburg'-forests or say better wood/swamp/flood-lands then, was de facto an ambush, as the roman empire experienced many of them over latter centuries. Experiences like that were quite common, and in these acient days this was about the maximum stage of expansion of a empire affordable by roman way of life! So Arminius was lucky to set his counterstrike almost perfectly in terms of timeline: there was no furhter expansion, not in northern Europe - despite knowlegde of huge landscape toward and beyond Baltic sea, not in the South (northern Africa - e.g. no interest of the origin of river Nile!) After this varus debacle policy toward outer rims seemed to have changed radically: in northern Germany it caused a retreat westbound of river Rhine, in southern Germany a retreat southbound of river Danube, and in open flank between this natural borderlines, an artificial border - the limes!
It could be interpreted in a way this quite infamous ambush affected whole life, culture, a significant change of self-assessment of northern tribes, a first augury how the decline of this invincible empire would likely take place!
Posted by Hannes Fischer on October 4,2009 | 01:50AM
Many historians have addressed themselves to the reasons the Romans set their borders on the Rhine and Danube. The consensus of opinion is that it wasn't because they lacked the ability to make incursions east and north of the rivers, which they often did over the centuries after Varus's defeat, but because they couldn't support their forces logistically once they did and never had any intention in doing so. It also should be pointed out that after AD 9, the Romans experienced their greatest successes, in Britain, Parthia, etc. And, finally, I would like to offer this: The tribes who defeated Varus became Roman allies, Roman legionnaires, even Roman citizens over the coming centuries. Germany was not born by them -- it was by others.
Posted by Mike Pellegrini on October 6,2009 | 09:43PM