“This is the soil of 2,000 years ago, where we are standing now,” Susanne Wilbers-Rost was saying as a young volunteer pried a small, dark clod out of it. Wilbers-Rost, a specialist in early German archaeology, peered through wire-rimmed glasses, brushed away some earth, and handed an object to me. “You’re holding a nail from a Roman soldier’s sandal,” she said. Atrim, short-haired woman, Wilbers-Rost has worked at the site, which is ten miles north of the manufacturing city of Osnabrück, Germany, since 1990. Inch by inch, several young archaeologists under her direction are bringing to light a battlefield that was lost for almost 2,000 years, until an off-duty British Army officer stumbled across it in 1987.
The sandal nail was a minor discovery, extracted from the soil beneath an overgrown pasture at the base of Kalkriese (the word may derive from Old High German for limestone), a 350-foot-high hill in an area where uplands slope down to the north German plain. But it was further proof that one of the pivotal events in European history took place here: in A.D. 9, three crack legions of Rome’s army were caught in an ambush and annihilated. Ongoing finds—ranging from simple nails to fragments of armor and the remains of fortifications—have verified the innovative guerrilla tactics that according to accounts from the period, neutralized the Romans’ superior weaponry and discipline.
It was a defeat so catastrophic that it threatened the survival of Rome itself and halted the empire’s conquest of Germany. “This was a battle that changed the course of history,” says Peter S. Wells, a specialist in Iron Age European archaeology at the University of Minnesota and the author of The Battle That Stopped Rome. “It was one of the most devastating defeats ever suffered by the Roman Army, and its consequences were the most far-reaching. The battle led to the
creation of a militarized frontier in the middle of Europe that endured for 400 years, and it created a boundary between Germanic and Latin cultures that lasted 2,000 years.” Had Rome not been defeated, says historian Herbert W. Benario, emeritus professor of classics at EmoryUniversity, a very different Europe would have emerged. “Almost all of modern Germany as well as much of the present-day CzechRepublic would have come under Roman rule. All Europe west of the Elbe might well have remained Roman Catholic; Germans would be speaking a Romance language; the Thirty Years’ War might never have occurred, and the long, bitter conflict between the French and the Germans might never have taken place.”
Founded (at least according to legend) in 753 b.c., Rome spent its formative decades as little more than an overgrown village. But within a few hundred years, Rome had conquered much of the Italian peninsula, and by 146 b.c., had leapt into the ranks of major powers by defeating Carthage, which controlled much of the western Mediterranean. By the beginning of the Christian Era, Rome’s sway extended from Spain to Asia Minor, and from the North Sea to the Sahara. The imperial navy had turned the Mediterranean into a Roman lake, and everywhere around the rim of the empire, Rome’s defeated enemies feared her legions—or so it seemed to optimistic Romans. “Germania” (the name referred originally to a particular tribe along the Rhine), meanwhile, did not exist as a nation at all. Various Teutonic tribes lay scattered across a vast wilderness that reached from present-day Holland to Poland. The Romans knew little of this densely forested territory governed by fiercely independent chieftains. They would pay dearly for their ignorance.
There are many reasons, according to ancient historians, that the imperial Roman legate Publius Quinctilius Varus set out so confidently that September in a.d. 9. He led an estimated 15,000 seasoned legionnaires from their summer quarters on the WeserRiver, in what is now northwestern Germany, west toward permanent bases near the Rhine. They were planning to investigate reports of an uprising among local tribes. Varus, 55, was linked by marriage to the imperial family and had served as Emperor Augustus’ representative in the province of Syria (which included modern Lebanon and Israel), where he had quelled ethnic disturbances. To Augustus, he must have seemed just the man to bring Roman civilization to the barbarous” tribes of Germany.
Like his patrons in Rome, Varus thought occupying Germany would be easy. “Varus was a very good administrator, but he was not a soldier,” says Benario. “To send him out into an unconquered land and tell him to make a province of it was a huge blunder on Augustus’ part.”
Rome’s imperial future was by no means foreordained. At age 35, Augustus, the first emperor, still styled himself “first citizen” in deference to lingering democratic sensibilities of the fallen RomanRepublic, whose demise—after the assassination of Caesar—had brought him to power in 27 b.c., following a century of bloody civil wars. During Augustus’ rule, Rome had grown into the largest city in the world, with a population that may have approached one million.


Although it took place some 2000 years ago it is still terribly sad.I have read and re-read the few modern books on the subject and the accounts of Tacitus and Vellius Pater---?(the general) and bits of Dio. It is remarkable that a British officer found the site thro'sheer singlemindedness. All my life I've been interested in Roman history(ancient). My curiousity was sparked one day as a small boy who wandered into a dingy museum in Wales. But I deviate! I have enjoyed reading your account of the Varus disaster. There are,however,unanswered questions,perhaps will never be answered. Why,for example,is no king mentioned? After all Arminius was a Prince? What of his mother? Was his brother, Flavius, a prince too before joining the Roman army. Why did he not join his brother? The river scene seems to suggest that they never really loved one another. Perhaps in those days,however, love never came into the equation...Regards Jeff Adams
Posted by Jeff Adams on March 11,2008 | 11:41AM
Next year, 2009 will be the 2000 anniversary of this battle. This is the original 911. 9/11/9 AD (11 September, 9) was the date of s great tragedy for Roman empire, but also a sea change in the development of Northern Europe and its offspring, 1500 years later; the Americas. People speculate on what might have been, but history is a one way river, with no regrets, no do-overs and no Mulligans. Germany the infant was born at this site in this battle. The joining together of the German tribes, to fight the Romans, was the beginning of a new stage in the history of the German peoples. From this battle we have the independence of a people, by their own hand, from Rome the conqueror, Rome the enforcer, Rome the Tax man. They proved themselves equal to the Romans in battle. They proved the Romans were not invincible. From this point on Rome began its long decline and eventual demise. Germany began its long ascent. When you see a bumper sticker that says: "Remember 9/11" ask yourself; "Which one?" 9/11/2001 or 9/11/9.
Posted by Guy K Bennett on July 29,2008 | 08:37PM
This is a fascinating piece of history that almost slipped away and doesn't receive the prominence it should. I remember first reading about this almost 30 years ago in a small entry in an enclyclopedia. One issue that has always bothered me is how these romain legions found themselves in this compromised and unwinnable situation. While the romans were not invincible, they did have a rigid approach to following rules while deployed and on the march. While Varus was a politician first and an field commander second (or more likely not at all) all roman legions had very strong and very capable professional soldiers at our equivalent of the non-commissioned officer level. The professional soldiers would simply not have allowed the deployment of soldiers discussed in the tellings of this battle here and by other sources. When roman legions were defeated (such as at Carrhae or Cannae) but it was almost always due to them being outfought and not cases where they were defeated by failure of adherence to elemental tactics. These histories I believe, but with obviously nothing more than a hunch, are missing something that explains a paradox of how three crack legions were slaughtered by failing to perhaps the most basic rule of marching by roman legions while deployed.
Posted by allan hughes on November 14,2008 | 08:34AM