How the Louisiana Purchase Changed the World
When Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory from France, he altered the shape of a nation and the course of history
- By Joseph Harriss
- Smithsonian magazine, April 2003, Subscribe
(Page 2 of 4)
For more than a century after La Salle took possession ofit, the LouisianaTerritory, with its scattered French, Spanish,Acadian and German settlements, along with those ofNative Americans and American-born frontiersmen, wastraded among European royalty at their whim. The Frenchwere fascinated by America—which they often symbolizedin paintings and drawings as a befeathered Noble Savagestanding beside an alligator—but they could not decidewhether it was a new Eden or, as the naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon declared, a primitive place fit onlyfor degenerate life-forms. But the official view was summedup by Antoine de La Mothe Cadillac, whom Louis XIVnamed governor of the territory in 1710: “The people are aheap of the dregs of Canada,” he sniffed in a 42-page reportto the king written soon after he arrived. The soldiers therewere untrained and undisciplined, he lamented, and thewhole colony was “not worth a straw at the present time.”Concluding that the area was valueless, Louis XV gave theterritory to his Bourbon cousin Charles III of Spain in 1763.But in 1800, the region again changed hands, when Napoléonnegotiated the clandestine Treaty of San Ildefonso withSpain’s Charles IV. The treaty called for the return of the vastterritory to France in exchange for the small kingdom ofEtruria in northern Italy, which Charles wanted for hisdaughter Louisetta.
When Jefferson heard rumors of Napoléon’s secret deal,he immediately saw the threat to America’s Western settlementsand its vital outlet to the Gulf of Mexico. If the dealwas allowed to stand, he declared, “it would be impossiblethat France and the United States can continue long asfriends.”Relations had been relaxed with Spain while it heldNew Orleans, but Jefferson suspected that Napoléon wantedto close the Mississippi to American use. This must havebeen a wrenching moment for Jefferson, who had long beena Francophile. Twelve years before, he had returned from afive-year stint as American minister to Paris, shipping home86 cases of furnishings and books he had picked up there.
The crunch came for Jefferson in October 1802. Spain’sKing Charles IV finally got around to signing the royal decreeofficially transferring the territory to France, and on October16, the Spanish administrator in New Orleans, JuanVentura Morales, who had agreed to administer the colonyuntil his French replacement, Laussat, could arrive, arbitrarilyended the American right to deposit cargo in the cityduty-free. He argued that the three-year term of the 1795treaty that had granted America this right and free passagethrough Spanish territory on the Mississippi had expired.Morales’ proclamation meant that American merchandisecould no longer be stored in New Orleans warehouses. As aresult, trappers’ pelts, agricultural produce and finishedgoods risked exposure and theft on open wharfs while awaitingshipment to the East Coast and beyond. The entire economyof America’s Western territories was in jeopardy. “Thedifficulties and risks . . . are incalculable,” warned the U.S.vice-consul in New Orleans, Williams E. Hulings, in a dispatchto Secretary of State James Madison.
As Jefferson had written in April 1802 to the U.S. ministerin Paris, Robert R. Livingston, it was crucial that the port ofNew Orleans remain open and free for American commerce,particularly the goods coming down the Mississippi River.“There is on the globe one single spot,” Jefferson wrote, “thepossessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It isNew Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighthsof our territory must pass to market.” Jefferson’s concern wasmore than commercial. “He had a vision of America as anempire of liberty,” says Douglas Brinkley. “And he saw theMississippi River not as the western edge of the country, butas the great spine that would hold the continent together.”
As it was, frontiersmen, infuriated by the abrogation ofthe right of deposit of their goods, threatened to seize NewOrleans by force. The idea was taken up by lawmakers suchas Senator James Ross of Pennsylvania, who drafted a resolutioncalling on Jefferson to form a 50,000-man army totake the city. The press joined the fray. The United States hadthe right, thundered the New York Evening Post, “to regulatethe future destiny of North America,” while the CharlestonCourier advocated “taking possession of the port . . . byforce of arms.” As Secretary of State James Madison explained,“The Mississippi is to them everything. It is theHudson, the Delaware, the Potomac, and all the navigablerivers of the Atlantic States, formed into one stream.”
With Congress and a vociferous press calling for action,Jefferson faced the nation’s most serious crisis since theAmerican Revolution. “Peace is our passion,” he declared,and expressed the concern that hotheaded members of theopposition Federalist Party might “force us into war.” He hadalready instructed Livingston in early 1802 to approachNapoléon’s foreign minister, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand,to try to prevent the cession of the territory to France, if thishad not already occurred, or, if the deal was done, to try topurchase New Orleans. In his initial meeting with Napoléonafter taking up his Paris post in 1801, Livingston had beenwarned about Old World ways. “You have come to a very corruptworld,” Napoléon told him frankly, adding roguishlythatTalleyrand was the right man to explain what he meantby corruption.
A wily political survivor who held high offices under theFrench Revolution, and later under Napoléon’s empire andthe restored Bourbon monarchy, Talleyrand had spent theyears 1792 to 1794 in exile in America after being denouncedby the revolutionary National Convention, and had conceiveda virulent contempt for Americans. “Refinement,” hedeclared, “does not exist” in the United States.As Napoléon’s foreign minister, Talleyrand customarilydemanded outrageous bribes for diplomatic results. Despitea clubfoot and what contemporaries called his “dead eyes,”he could be charming and witty when he wanted—whichhelped camouflage his basic negotiating tactic of delay. “Thelack of instructions and the necessity of consulting one’s governmentare always legitimate excuses in order to obtain delaysin political affairs,” he once wrote. When Livingstontried to discuss the territory, Talleyrand simply denied thatthere was any treaty between France and Spain. “There neverwas a government in which less could be done by negotiationthan here,” a frustrated Livingston wrote to Madison onSeptember 1, 1802. “There is no people, no legislature, nocounselors. One man is everything.”
But Livingston, although an inexperienced diplomat,tried to keep himself informed about the country to whichhe was ambassador. In March 1802, he warned Madison thatFrance intended to “have a leading interest in the politics ofour western country” and was preparing to send 5,000 to7,000 troops from its Caribbean colony of Saint Domingue(now Haiti) to occupy New Orleans. But Napoléon’s troopsin Saint Domingue were being decimated by a revolution andan outbreak of yellow fever. In June, Napoléon ordered Gen.Claude Victor to set out for New Orleans from the FrenchcontrolledNetherlands. But by the time Victor assembledenough men and ships in January 1803, ice blocked the Dutchport, making it impossible for him to set sail.
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Comments (2)
This is way good information
Posted by Cami muril on February 4,2013 | 08:10 PM
Is there a picture of Jean Suan's painting: Allegory of France Liberating America?
Posted by Pat Sweet on March 30,2009 | 06:35 PM